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H. Jefferson Powell 
Grand Visions in an Age of Conflict 
introduction 
Last spring Professor Laurence H. Tribe commented that federal 
constitutional law is in a state of intellectual disarray: “[I]n area after area, we 
find ourselves at a fork in the road—a point at which it’s fair to say things 
could go in any of several directions” and we have “little common ground from 
which to build agreement.”1 No doubt fortuitously, two of our most 
formidable constitutional scholars, Akhil R. Amar and Jed Rubenfeld, have 
recently published systematic studies that implicitly challenge Tribe’s 
conclusion that “ours [is] a peculiarly bad time to be going out on a limb to 
propound a Grand Unified Theory—or anything close.”2 With admirable 
boldness, Professors Amar and Rubenfeld have done precisely that—gone out 
on a limb, or rather two very different limbs, to propound their own accounts 
of what American constitutionalism is, or should be. Amar’s America’s 
Constitution and Rubenfeld’s Revolution by Judiciary are alike in that each is its 
author’s synthesis of a remarkable effort, sustained over a number of years, to 
develop a comprehensive vision of the Constitution. We have much to learn 
from their successes as well as from the points at which they are, I believe, in 
error. 
i. amar’s constitution 
A. The Constitution of Text and Structure 
Readers familiar with the prolific work of Akhil Amar will find in America’s 
Constitution a fitting capstone to two decades of erudite and wide-ranging 
 
1.  Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (2005). 
2.  Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted). 
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scholarship. From his first major article, Of Sovereignty and Federalism 
(published in 1987),3 Amar’s work has been characterized by an unusually close 
attention to the text of the Constitution, to the structure of the instrument as a 
document, and to the Federal Republic as a system of government. An intense 
interest in history, backed up by exhaustive research, and an admirable 
willingness to think outside the confines of what passes in constitutional law 
for ordinary science have also been salient elements in the Amar oeuvre. His 
lively mind and facile pen have made his work unavoidable for anyone 
interested in constitutional law, including many aspects of the law of the 
Constitution, such as criminal procedure, that are now treated by almost 
everyone else as separate areas of research and writing. 
America’s Constitution crystallizes both Amar’s general approach and his 
substantive themes. He comments almost at the beginning that his goal is “to 
reacquaint twenty-first-century Americans with the written Constitution” 
rather than to contribute to the endless discussion of “legal dictums and 
doctrines that appear nowhere in the Constitution itself.”4 Almost at the end of 
the book’s text, he comments that he “ha[s] tried to give the reader facts and 
figures—lots of them,”5 and he certainly cannot be faulted on either score. 
America’s Constitution is not exactly a line by line review of the instrument’s 
provisions, but I know of no other book in many years as comprehensive in its 
treatment of all parts of the constitutional text. It is, furthermore, full of 
historical information, some of it likely to surprise even the most informed 
reader, and all of it arranged so as to lure the reader on rather than deter her. 
Amar’s interest in structural matters bears fruit repeatedly in discussions of 
the origins of constitutional language and of American governmental practice 
that are of the greatest interest. I will not stop to give details, but Amar’s 
treatment of the pervasive role of slavery in the Constitution of 1787, and (on 
that topic and others) his industry in asking—and answering—questions about 
the practical consequences of constitutional arrangements are excellent 
examples of how fascinating his work can be.6 Furthermore, Amar’s zest for 
this sort of fine-grained and imaginative consideration of structural 
arrangements is infectious: When he remarks at the end that he thinks a “well-
 
3.  96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). 
4.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at xi (2005). 
5.  Id. at 469. 
6.  For specific examples, see his discussion of the 1787 Constitution’s attribution to slave states 
of representation based on a formula counting each slave as three-fifths of a free inhabitant, 
id. at 88-98, his shrewd insight into the historical significance of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause’s wording for separation of powers, id. at 110-13, and his observations about the 
Twelfth Amendment, id at 149-52, 336-47. 
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chosen number can be every bit as interesting as a well-chosen quote,”7 I 
suspect that a great many readers will feel, as I did, that Amar chose well. 
B. The Secondary Role of History 
America’s Constitution is a learned and in some respects even a brilliant 
book, but it is also deeply problematic. Perhaps the briefest way to identify my 
concern is that I fear this is a book, and maybe an author, unsure of what the 
subject under discussion really is. The result, I think, is that in too many places 
the reader not caught up entirely by Professor Amar’s facts and figures may 
find herself unable to say precisely what sort of conclusions Amar is offering 
us. 
The full title of Amar’s book is America’s Constitution: A Biography, and one 
might expect the final noun to define, even if metaphorically, the book’s genre. 
The 1787 text that we refer to as the (original) Constitution has a history in 
several senses: It is a historical document and an enormous amount can and 
has been said about its antecedents, the history of its drafting by the 
Philadelphia Framers, and the debates and political maneuvering by which it 
came to be accepted as the constitutive legal instrument of the American 
Republic. Similar enquiries can be made about the later bits of text that 
together with the 1787 document make up the Constitution to be found in 
casebooks on federal constitutional law. It would make obvious if nonliteral 
sense to term a historical study of some aspect of these matters “a biography.” 
It would be clear the author’s claims were assertions of political history (i.e., 
this is how Alexander Hamilton and company turned a clear Anti-Federalist 
majority into the losing side on the issue of ratification in New York) or 
intellectual history (i.e., this is what Alexander Hamilton thought the term 
“direct Taxes” meant). Amar gives us a considerable amount of detail about the 
politics behind various constitutional provisions and the constitutional 
opinions of various historical actors. Furthermore, in the last paragraph of the 
book he claims that his goal has been “to understand precisely what the 
document did and did not mean to those who enacted and amended it,”8 
suggesting that he is indeed writing intellectual history. However, while it is 
dangerous to reject a scholar’s own explanation of his methods and goals, I 
believe that this statement is in reality erroneous: it is, as I shall argue, quite 
contrary to Amar’s actual practices in justifying claims about constitutional 
 
7.  Id. at 469. 
8.  Id. at 477. 
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meaning in America’s Constitution. Despite all its historical detail, political and 
intellectual, America’s Constitution is not, in the end, a book of history. 
Consider, as an example, the lengthy discussion of the Constitution’s 
Preamble to which Amar devotes the first chapter of America’s Constitution. As 
in many other chapters, Amar uses his focus on a particular constitutional 
provision as the vehicle for a discussion of other, more broad-ranging themes. 
Chapter one returns to questions Amar has thought about for many years: the 
nature of the Union and the locus of sovereignty within that Union. Amar 
quickly and correctly reminds the reader that debate over such matters loomed 
large in the antebellum history of the United States. Hamiltonians and 
Jeffersonians fought over the scope of congressional power, Webster and Story 
squared off against the nullifiers, and Unionists and secessionists alike justified 
the Civil War—all in terms of an interminable debate over whether the states 
or the Union was originally sovereign, what the various events since 
independence might have done to the original arrangements, and (finally) 
whether individual states had the legal right to leave the Union. 
There are many historical enquiries one can make into this history of 
debate, but to be historical enquiries they must address issues about what the 
individuals and groups involved meant or did, or about what the ordinary 
person of the time would have thought about the matter (often a hard question 
to answer with confidence, but not in its nature ahistorical). But Amar’s real 
interest lies not in the history of antebellum opinion but in what he evidently 
thinks of as the answer to a normative or legal question. Speaking in his own 
voice, he tells us that “both before and after ratifying the Articles [of 
Confederation], the people of each state—and not the people of America as a 
whole—were sovereign”;9 “[a]lthough states would enter the Constitution as 
true sovereigns, they would not remain so after [a] ratification” that “would 
itself end each state’s sovereign status and would prohibit future unilateral 
secession”;10 it is an error to claim “that none of the thirteen original states had 
ever been truly sovereign.”11 Each of these assertions was entirely familiar to 
antebellum constitutionalists. Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson Davis agreed 
with the first and last while denying the second; John Jay and Abraham 
Lincoln held the opposite view . . . and Professor Amar is willing to explain to 
us where each was wrong and each right, and why.12 
 
9.  Id. at 26. 
10.  Id. at 33. 
11.  Id. at 39. 
12.  I mention Jay only because his discussion of the locus-of-sovereignty question in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which Amar never discusses on this issue, is an 
especially clear statement of the nationalist position at a point in time immediately after 
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It is rather fun to see a twenty-first-century scholar answer nineteenth-
century questions and chastise nineteenth-century statesmen, but if this were 
meant to be history, the attempt to do so would be a category error: The views 
of historical figures on a question of constitutional interpretation in dispute 
among them cannot be right or wrong when the question at hand is what the 
historical meaning of the document was. They are witnesses to the question of 
historical meaning, whereas the issue of who was right and who wrong is a 
normative matter of law or politics or morality. Unless one adopts a strongly 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, the attempt to adjudicate 
between the opinions held by these historical figures mixes intellectual apples 
and oranges. The difficulty is not ameliorated even if we shift our attention to 
what Amar later calls “the meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution.”13 
It is true that President Lincoln thought (and Professor Amar believes) that the 
inherent meaning of the ratification process of 1787-1788 entailed the merger of 
the states’ individual sovereignties into an indivisible nation, but President 
Jefferson and many others have thought that inherent meaning was quite the 
opposite.14 Once again, history cannot prove the correct answer to the 
normative question either way, and assertions about the normative answer are 
not history. 
I slipped in a qualification in the middle of the preceding paragraph. It is 
perfectly sensible to argue, for example, that the historical evidence shows that 
most Founding-era Americans thought Jefferson wrong and the antebellum 
nationalists right on the locus of sovereignty after ratification—though I 
personally doubt that the evidence can be marshaled either way. If one 
stipulates a strictly originalist view of constitutional interpretation (one 
formulation: the normative meaning of a constitutional provision is that which 
most competent interpreters would have thought it meant when it was made 
law15), then a convincing historical argument on that question of intellectual 
 
ratification. While Amar makes little use of Supreme Court opinions, it is striking that he 
ignores Jay while quoting John Marshall’s opinion in the much later case of Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
13.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 470. 
14.  While the question of secession is, I assume, permanently off the table, one need only read 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion for four justices in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), to see that Jefferson’s understanding of 1787-
1788 as leaving the states’ individual sovereignties intact at a basic level is alive and well. 
15.  There have been many attempts to fine-tune a definition of constitutional originalism. I am 
employing the one that seems to me the most plausible, but resolving this definitional 
matter is irrelevant for present purposes for, as stated in the text, Professor Amar is not a 
strict originalist. 
I am indebted to my friend and colleague Walter Dellinger for the adjective. Dellinger 
has long argued that the existence of a written Constitution necessarily makes a moderate 
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history would answer the normative question of constitutional meaning as 
well. 
Professor Amar, however, is clearly not a strict originalist. Proofs of this in 
America’s Constitution are legion: The Commerce Clause, for example, may 
provide a constitutional basis for federal regulation of “all forms of intercourse 
in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic . . . if a given problem 
genuinely spill[s] across state or national lines”;16 Article V may not be the 
exclusive means of amending the Constitution;17 and there may be Ninth 
Amendment rights that “might not be inferable from the Constitution’s text 
and structure but that nevertheless might deserve constitutional status.”18 
Amar cannot explain the use of history and law in America’s Constitution on 
strict-originalist grounds because he does not practice that approach to 
constitutional interpretation. 
Professor Amar’s conclusions about sovereignty are not historical 
assertions, nor are they propositions of strict-originalist constitutional law. 
Still less are they presented as interpretations of standard legal doctrine, the 
usual grist for constitutional mills but an enterprise that (as we have seen) 
Amar expressly puts to one side in America’s Constitution. In form and logic, 
they bear little resemblance to the sorts of empirical, economic, and 
institutional enquiries that interest most contemporary political scientists. 
Here, as at many other points in the book, Amar’s answers to what “the 
Constitution” means simply do not speak to the sorts of questions historians, 
lawyers, and political scientists raise. So exactly what kind of answers is 
Professor Amar giving us—and to what questions?19 
 
originalism an indispensable starting point for anything that can plausibly claim to be 
American constitutional law: A refusal to use original meaning to establish the starting point 
for the words the document uses would render the text infinitely manipulable. Dellinger, 
Amar, and I are all moderate originalists in this sense. 
16.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 107-08. 
17.  Id. at 295-99. Amar cites only James Wilson from the Founding era as possibly supporting 
this idea, and his earlier scholarship to the same effect points to little else relevant to an 
originalist. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Here, as elsewhere when he diverges 
radically from the more usual views, in America’s Constitution Amar tends to avoid direct 
statements and to present his argument as a matter of interpretive possibility: “shouldn’t 
Article V . . . be read as nonexclusive?” AMAR, supra note 4, at 297. My point is that Amar 
has no a priori objection to accepting as correct constitutional arguments that cannot be 
defended on strict-originalist grounds. 
18.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 328.  
19.  Just to be clear: I am not criticizing Amar in the least for his decision not to load the text 
down with “quibbling qualifiers.” AMAR, supra note 4, at 470. He is quite clear from the 
beginning that America’s Constitution is “an opinionated biography.” Id. at xii. The problem 
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C. The Textualism of Real Meaning  
The answer to our conundrum, according to Professor Amar himself, is 
that he is “a constitutional textualist”20: He is not, therefore, so much 
interested in what any individual, whether founder or twenty-first-century 
American, thought or thinks about the meaning of the written Constitution, 
but rather in what the Constitution means in itself. At the beginning of his 
discussion of the questions of national unity and state sovereignty, Amar 
comments that “[i]n word and deed, the Constitution yielded its own answers 
to these epic questions.”21 What Amar seeks to explain, then, is the 
Constitution’s own resolution of the issues that divided Hamilton and 
Jefferson, Lincoln and Davis. His license to adjudicate between these historical 
figures—to tell us when Lincoln was right and Davis wrong—stems from the 
Constitution itself, which has its own intrinsic meaning that is quite distinct 
from the views of even its most distinguished makers and interpreters. From 
this perspective, furthermore, concerned as it is with the written Constitution 
rather than with matters that “appear nowhere in the Constitution itself,”22 
issues such as whether most people in 1788 or 1868 would have agreed with 
Amar’s conclusions are secondary. 
Amar is not, of course, a narrow literalist–recall his invocation of “the 
meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution.”23 He writes: “I myself do 
not believe that all of American constitutionalism can be deduced simply from 
the document.”24 A sophisticated textualism of the sort he intends to employ 
must take account of “both constitutional politics (how did the text come to be 
enacted?) and constitutional law (what did the enacted text mean?).”25 To do 
so fully, Amar believes, requires one to transgress the disciplinary boundaries 
that, he rather clearly thinks, handicap the work of most other scholars. “Law, 
history, and political science–these three disciplines form the legs of the stool 
on which this book rests.”26 Amar’s ambition is “to synthesize” these three 
disciplines in writing his account of the Constitution since “each discipline in 
 
with the locus-of-sovereignty discussion in chapter one, a problem that I believe appears 
recurrently in America’s Constitution, is that it is unclear what Amar is giving his opinions 
about. 
20.  Id. at 470. 
21.  Id. at 21. 
22.  Id. at xi. 
23.  Id. at 470. 
24.  Id. at 477. 
25.  Id. at 469. 
26.  Id. at 467. 
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isolation may be faulted”27: The lawyer’s attention to the logic and normative 
implications of the text’s provisions, the historian’s knowledge of the conflicts 
that shaped the text, and the political scientist’s interest in how political 
structures interact are all necessary if we are to understand in an appropriately 
sophisticated way the meaning of the written Constitution. 
Amar is not, furthermore, an exegete of isolated clauses. Despite his 
deliberate focus at many points on the meaning of particular constitutional 
terms, Amar’s practice of constitutional textualism is an enquiry into the 
meaning of the Constitution–including all of its amendments–as an integrated 
and coherent whole. Amar’s textualism is not a clause-bound interpretivism 
but a broad enquiry into how the “various provisions . . . intermesh to form 
larger patterns of meaning and structures of decision making.”28 Amar 
sometimes refers to “the larger pattern”29 evidenced by distinct provisions and 
the “general . . . vision inform[ing] much” of the Constitution’s “overall 
structure and many of its specific words.”30 He is intensely interested in what 
he sees as the “multiple textual harmonies at play”31 among different 
provisions–including provisions written and adopted at different times–and in 
the “keys and cues” to be found in the details of “the Founding act and text,”32 
which, in his judgment, reveal the underlying meaning of the Constitution 
viewed as a unified whole. The underlying assumption in all this, of course, is 
that the Constitution in fact has a coherent overall meaning, and that its 
individual provisions, including provisions enacted at widely separated points 
in time, can be put side by side to yield meanings that separately they would 
not have. But this is the theory: How does Amar’s textualism work in practice? 
Before answering that question, I need to be clear about a few matters over 
which Professor Amar and I have no dispute. No one doubts that specific 
constitutional arrangements (the structuring of the legislative process in Article 
I, for example) were intended to produce coherent, or at least workable, 
governmental procedures.33 It makes good historical sense to attempt to 
discern how the makers of a particular constitutional arrangement meant it to 
work, it is worthy political science to examine how the Constitution’s 
 
27.  Id. at 466-67. 
28.  Id. at xii. 
29.  Id. at 301. 
30.  Id. at 51. 
31.  Id. at 326. 
32.  Id. at 472 n.*. 
33.  Equally, however, no one believes that the Constitution’s various makers always succeeded 
in doing so—no one including Professor Amar. His unhappiness with the Article V 
amendment process is especially striking. 
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governmental procedures work and have worked in practice, and it is one of 
the lawyer’s quintessential tasks to harmonize clashing or discordant 
provisions in a binding legal instrument. But Professor Amar’s theoretical 
“aspiration [is] to holism . . . to unite law, history, and political science [and] 
to view the document over its entire life span.”34 His disciplinary tools are 
meant to serve a task–the search for the actual meaning of the Constitution–
that transcends them all. As I shall suggest, this search leads to less obvious, 
and less obviously correct, results than one might expect. I have space to deal at 
length with only one example. 
Amar criticizes “modern observers” for slighting “the significance of 
geographic/geostrategic considerations that loomed large in the Federalist 
vision”35 and regards America’s Constitution as a creative and even novel 
correction to this error. The implicit but unmistakable claim to novelty is 
overstated: It is hard to imagine that many scholars would disagree with the 
proposition that the Founders were concerned about creating a federal 
government capable of addressing the foreign policy and national security 
needs of the Republic.36 However, it is certainly the case that important aspects 
of Professor Amar’s presentation of this commonplace are original. In his view, 
for example, the Founders’ “geostrategic vision of union [was] distilled in the 
Preamble,”37 by which he means that the Preamble’s words reveal that the 
Constitution as a whole has as its inherent purpose the creation of “an island 
nation . . . where foreign powers would be far removed and where internal 
borders would be demilitarized.”38 This is a singular assertion: There is, as far 
as America’s Constitution shows or I am aware, no evidence that anyone in the 
Founding era thought that the Preamble did any such thing other than in the 
general and almost trivial sense that it was a statement of the Constitution’s 
goals. 
There is a similar problem with Professor Amar’s “distinctive claim[]” that 
the Preamble’s “proper place [was] the Founders’ foundation” and that other 
 
34.  Id. at 469. 
35.  Id. at 472-73. 
36.  In fact, the scholarly literature is full of attention to the role of what Amar terms 
“geostrategy” in the making and early interpretation of the Constitution. For a provocative 
recent example, see Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy 
and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021 (2003). Our overall understanding of the role 
such considerations play in the making of a constitutional order has been enormously 
enriched by PHILIP BOBBIT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY (2002). Professor Amar mentions the work of neither Delahunty nor Bobbitt. 
37.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 106. 
38.  Id. at 44. 
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scholars have ignored this fact.39 The claim is distinctive but unpersuasive. The 
Preamble’s language was cast in the common idiom of American political 
discourse and in many respects (“Justice . . . common defense . . . general 
Welfare”) that of all Western political discourse. On occasion, to be sure, 
constitutionalists and politicians have quoted its particular phrases but the 
scarcity of such usages is unsurprising: The common law treated preambular 
material in a legal instrument as without direct legal force, and for that and 
other reasons the Preamble has understandably played little role in discussion 
of a document universally treated as law.40 Amar’s claim that the particular use 
of this language in the Preamble was of great importance historically, or that it 
sheds much light on the legal interpretation of the rest of the Constitution or 
on the institutional dynamics of our political system is, at best, unproven in 
America’s Constitution. 
Given Professor Amar’s frequent stress on the importance of verbal 
parallels, it is appropriate to examine a specific instance of the manner in which 
he attempts to use such parallels to show the importance of the Preamble. We 
are told that Article I, Section 8 begins with words that show that the 
Preamble’s “geostrategic vision” informs the Constitution’s grant of powers to 
Congress: “section 8 began by echoing the Preamble almost verbatim, in 
language affirming the need to ‘Provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare.’”41 The “echo” is, however, no more exact than the “[s]imilar 
phraseology” which, as Amar properly acknowledges at once, is found in 
Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, the language of section 8 
(“provide for the common Defence and general Welfare”) seems to me closer 
as a verbal matter to that of the Articles (“incurred for the common defense or 
general welfare”) than it is to that of the Preamble, which breaks the two nouns 
into separate infinitive phrases. Why then doesn’t Section 8 show that it 
 
39.  Id. at 471. 
40.  In 1791, the first Federal Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, rejected reliance on the 
Preamble in constitutional argument in advising President Washington that the national 
bank bill was invalid: 
“The Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of power. 
To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble if it be operative 
is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the Constitution is useless; but that 
it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which they supposed would 
be best fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of 
preambles.” 
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney 
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 125 (1994) (quoting Randolph’s 
unpublished opinion). 
41.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 106. 
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embodies the geostrategic vision distilled in the Articles, the language of which 
it echoes almost verbatim? The answer, one fears, is that America’s Constitution 
posits a sharp contrast between the Articles and the Constitution in this and 
other matters, and that the inconvenient parallel in word choice between 
Section 8 and the Articles does not serve to advance this contrast. I agree 
entirely with any reader inclined to dismiss all of this as insignificant verbal 
quibbling—but Professor Amar cannot rightly do so because he puts great 
weight on such “textual harmonies.” 
If this were an isolated example of how Amar’s textualism works, one 
might properly set it aside as a slip, but the passage is, I believe, exemplary of 
how his textualism often plays out in practice. I will give a few other examples 
briefly, but to gauge the fairness of my criticism the reader must read America’s 
Constitution itself. Professor Amar assures us that the Constitution rests on “a 
clear commitment to people over property.” Perhaps, but the observation that 
the expression “private property” never appears in the 1787 document and that 
the noun’s only occurrence refers to government property42 does little to 
advance the claim; slavery, the importance of which to the 1787 Constitution 
Amar details at length, never appears as a verbal matter either. Although Article 
I “borrow[ed] the name of confederate America’s central organ—‘Congress’—it 
promised a quite different institution,” in part (we are told) by expressly 
granting to the constitutional Congress “legislative Powers” and referring to its 
power to make “Laws”;43 true enough about the Constitution’s terminology, 
but the second provision of the Articles referred to “every power, jurisdiction, 
and right . . . delegated to” the Confederation Congress, and that body 
designated its own enactments as “ordinances.” Do the verbal differences mean 
that much?44 That the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Amendments “aimed to 
protect popular rights [as opposed to sheerly individual ones] via institutions 
(the militia and the jury) that would embody ‘the people’ themselves” is 
indicated, Amar believes, by the occurrence of “security” in the Second, 
“secure” in the Fourth, and “securities” in an early draft of the Seventh 
 
42.  Id. at 17. 
43.  Id. at 57. 
44.  The first definition of “ordinance” in Dr. Johnson’s dictionary is “Law, rule, precept.” The 
Federalist describes the enactments of the Confederation Congress as “laws” and asserts, in 
the course of minimizing the difference between that body and the legislature proposed by 
the 1787 instrument, that the old Congress “have as compleat authority” as the new 
Congress would to make its pronouncements legally binding. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 
21 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 37, 45 (James Madison). The point is not that Amar is wrong 
to see a significant difference between the two bodies, but rather that his verbal 
observations, here as elsewhere, often do little to advance his conclusions. 
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Amendment.45 America’s Constitution abounds in this type of ingenious but 
unconvincing exegesis of the Constitution’s wording.46 
D. An Underlying Problem of Method? 
When an eminent constitutionalist writes that the 1787 document’s concern 
with protecting the territorial integrity of the United States “informed . . . its 
pointed Article VI language describing the Constitution as the law of ‘the 
Land’”,47 it is clear that something has gone wrong. How could such a learned 
and industrious scholar make such a claim, or the other, similarly remarkable 
assertions that abound in America’s Constitution? I believe that at least part of 
the answer lies in Professor Amar’s desire to craft a new and more sophisticated 
textualism employing the three disciplines of history, law, and political science. 
His goal, of course, is to reach a richer understanding of the text by melding 
these disciplines. All too often, unfortunately, the result is that his textualism 
escapes the constraints of all three, and Amar offers us readings of the text that 
are indefensible as history, law, or political science. 
As a historical matter, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI was obviously 
using the familiar language of the Magna Carta. No competent lawyer would 
argue in a brief or opinion that the reference to “the land” in the clause sheds 
any light on the powers or responsibilities of the federal government (and 
certainly not any reference to protecting the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Republic), and a political scientist would be interested in the role of federal law 
 
45.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 326-27. Professor Amar points out, fairly enough, that the Second and 
Fourth Amendments refer to “the right of the people” and that Madison’s draft of what 
became the Seventh has the same expression with “rights” in the plural. The problem—
besides the odd reliance on a draft that was very substantially modified before it was 
proposed and adopted—is, as with his use of the Preamble, that these phrases are the 
common coin of Founding-era political discussion. Without more, their use proves only the 
truism that the Bill of Rights is cast in the language of the era that created it. The use of 
words at various points with the common root “secure” is, I think, of no interpretive 
significance whatever. 
46.  Attorney General Randolph, whom I quoted earlier, pointed out in 1791 the ironic error in 
putting this sort of weight on the precise wording of the constitutional text: 
“Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily perceive the 
force of what is expressed in the letter of the convention, ‘That the Constitution 
was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual deference & concession.’ To argue, 
then, from its style or arrangement, as being logically exact, is perhaps a scheme 
of reasoning not absolutely precise.” 
Dellinger & Powell, supra note 40, at 128 (quoting Randolph’s unpublished opinion). Over-
precision in constitutional textualism, in other words, can lead to lead to legal imprecision! 
47.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 51. 
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supremacy in enabling the Republic to safeguard the interests of the whole, not 
in what amounts to a pun. Other than as a joke—which he plainly does not 
intend it to be—Amar’s reference to the language of the Supremacy Clause fits 
into no obvious area of discourse. 
America’s Constitution would have been a more persuasive book if Amar had 
actually written the work that his words occasionally suggest—an encyclopedic 
examination of the text’s original meaning informed by his deep interest in 
institutional dynamics. But that would have been merely to write history, and 
Amar’s deep ambition goes beyond history or law or political science. The 1787 
document, as he so often reminds the reader, begins with the words “We the 
People,” and Amar the textualist takes that bit of text with alarming 
seriousness. In America’s Constitution, the real story is not his often illuminating 
discussions of the political struggles that lay behind the various provisions, 
enacted at various times, which we collectively refer to as the Constitution. It is 
instead the story of a text that has a unity transcending the limits of history and 
chronology,48 a story in which the real actor, the actual creator of the 
Constitution, is a People whose identity is not bound by time.49 It is an 
imaginative story, told well, but the reader should take it cum grano salis. 
ii. rubenfeld’s revolution 
A. The Form of the Argument 
In 1989 a young lawyer then in private practice published a remarkable 
article entitled The Right of Privacy.50 Roe v. Wade has had many defenders, but 
those who are academic lawyers have often acted as such with an uneasy 
conscience, fearing that the great John Hart Ely was right in rejecting the 
decision as one that “is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an 
obligation to try to be.”51 Indeed it is arguable, as Ely himself feared, that the 
 
48.  Professor Amar’s search for echoes and harmonies in the language of constitutional 
provisions ranges forward and backward in time: He is as critical of “historians of the 
Founding” for “often fail[ing] to show much interest in the intense secession debate that 
occurred many decades later,” as he is of “Civil War historians [who] are not always fluent 
in the facts of the Founding.” Id. at 472 n.*. 
49.  See, e.g., id. at 10 (“The people had taken center stage and enacted their own supreme law” 
in 1788); id. at 468 (“We the People eventually abolished slavery and promised equal rights 
to blacks and, later, women”). 
50.  Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
51.  John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 
(1973). 
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desperate wish to protect the outcome in Roe has led many of its proponents 
essentially to abandon the effort to distinguish constitutional decisions by the 
Supreme Court from political decisionmaking by Congress or the state 
legislatures.52 Jed Rubenfeld, on the other hand, made it clear in 1989, once 
and for all, that he will have none of that. The Court got the law of the 
Constitution right in Roe in his view, and for that reason—and only so—the 
Court should adhere to the decision. Rubenfeld’s article was the single most 
sustained and powerful legal justification for Roe that had ever been written, 
and his work since then has combined a forthright adherence as a general 
matter to the Court’s “liberal” decisions with an unrelenting insistence that 
judicial review is legitimate only as the exercise of the power to interpret and 
apply law and not as a simple form of political choice. In Revolution by Judiciary, 
Rubenfeld has given us his clearest account to date of how the Court ought to 
decide constitutional cases, and how in doing so it is interpreting the 
Constitution rather than imposing the political preferences of the Justices. 
Revolution by Judiciary divides into three parts of roughly the same length. 
The third and final section is an incisive critique of the Rehnquist Court’s 
constitutional legacy, which Rubenfeld identifies as the pursuit of an 
unacknowledged and indefensible agenda of opposition to the anti-
discrimination principles that the Court and Congress appropriately enforced 
in the past.53 Important and interesting as his arguments on that score are,54 I 
believe that Rubenfeld’s fundamental contribution to constitutional law lies in 
the discussion, mostly though not entirely in the book’s first section, of how 
constitutional decisions are and ought to be reached. In this Commentary I 
shall focus my attention on that discussion, although I shall conclude my 
consideration of Revolution by Judiciary with some comments on the arguments 
in the second section of Rubenfeld’s book, which offers a theory of why 
constitutional law has normative force. 
B. The Missing Law of Constitutional Interpretation 
There are two background presuppositions to the argument of Revolution 
by Judiciary. The first is that the history of constitutional law is one of “radical 
 
52.  See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where 
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991). 
53.  JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-83 (2005). 
54.  Among many possible examples, see his excellent, sharply critical discussion of the Court’s 
adoption of strict scrutiny as the proper form of review for race-based affirmative action. Id. 
at 195-201. 
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judicial reinterpretation” of the Constitution: the repeated episodes in which 
the Supreme Court has rejected established understandings of the Constitution 
and replaced them with novel principles and conclusions of its own devising.55 
The Court and its defenders often explain such radical reinterpretation with a 
“rhetoric of restoration” (what seems novel is in fact the recovery of an earlier 
constitutional vision that has been lost) or the claim that all that has changed 
are the circumstances of decision and not the constitutional principles the 
Court employs. In Professor Rubenfeld’s opinion these are charades that serve 
only to obscure the truth that in such situations the Court is “creat[ing] . . . 
genuinely innovative constitutional law—decisions that break profoundly from 
both past understandings and present doctrines.”56 Brown v. Board of Education 
didn’t recover the lost truth about the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause: 
It introduced a new and creative understanding of equal protection into 
American constitutional law. 
Rubenfeld’s second presupposition is that American constitutional law “has 
no account of radical reinterpretation.” He asks, “What, if anything, makes it 
legitimate for judges to re-read the Constitution radically . . . . What, if 
anything, guides or structures this power? What, if anything, limits it?”57 Even 
worse, if possible, lawyers and scholars cannot explain how judges are to go 
about making constitutional decisions even when they intend no revolutionary 
change. “There is no law of constitutional interpretation”; constitutional law 
thus “has nearly nothing to say about the connection between the Constitution 
and the enormous web of doctrine spun judicially around that document.”58 
This poses no problem, to be sure, for a self-proclaimed pragmatist like Judge 
Richard Posner who sees constitutional “law” as the creation of outcomes “well 
adapted to the country’s needs” without regard to any duty to “‘abide by 
constitutional or statutory text.’”59 One takes the Posnerian route, however, 
only by giving up on the traditional understanding that constitutional law is 
 
55.  “Radical reinterpretation is, precisely, a new interpretation of the basic principles or 
purposes behind a constitutional provision. Through this act of reinterpretation, new 
constitutional purposes or principles replace the original ones.” Id. at 9. 
56.  Id. at 8-9. “Constitutional law has utterly rejected originalism” as the limiting criterion for 
judicial decisionmaking. Id. at 65. I will note below the sense in which one could view 
Rubenfeld as a kind of originalist. 
57.  Id. at 3. 
58.  Id. at 5. 
59.  Id. at 10. Rubenfeld is quoting Judge Posner’s denial of the existence of such a duty in 
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 737, 739 (2002), surely one of the most remarkable statements ever to be made by a 
sitting federal judge. Rubenfeld’s response to Posner is, I believe, utterly convincing. See Jed 
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 767 (2002). 
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authoritative precisely because the judges who make it see their “first duty” to 
be “to abide by the Constitution: to deliver a just reading of that document 
according to interpretive criteria.”60 Pragmatism in Judge Posner’s sense is 
simply the abandonment of law altogether, and that Rubenfeld is unwilling to 
do. 
Fortunately for those of us less intrepid than Judge Posner, according to 
Revolution by Judiciary we have no need to give up on constitutional law as law 
in the sense I have just quoted. Despite the existence of radical change in 
constitutional law, and the nonexistence of a shared explicit understanding 
about how to do constitutional law properly, “[t]he extraordinary fact” is that 
virtually all of constitutional law—including almost all the many instances in 
which the disparate and often political “approaches, motives, and biases” of the 
justices have been on display—has been worked out “within a determinate 
interpretive structure.”61 Although neither the courts nor anyone else has been 
consciously working within that structure, Rubenfeld believes that he can 
show the existence of an internal logic to constitutional decisionmaking, one 
that is continuously at work both in decisions about the Constitution’s grants 
of power and in ones concerning individual rights. The first part of the book is 
a summary and restatement of the work Rubenfeld has long been doing in 
uncovering and explaining what his subtitle calls “the structure of American 
constitutional law.” 
C. Does Constitutional Law Have an Implicit Logic? 
The key to understanding the implicit logic of constitutional law lies in 
what Professor Rubenfeld calls the “impossibly simple distinction”62 between 
the historical understanding of what a constitutional provision addresses and 
historical understandings about those matters that the provision does not 
address. 
Let us say, as a shorthand, that a prohibitory [provision] applies to 
those actions it prohibits, and that it does not apply to those actions it 
does not prohibit. So I will call specific understandings of what a 
constitutional right prohibits Application Understandings, and of what it 
does not prohibit, No-Application Understandings. . . . 
Similarly, with respect to constitutional power-granting provisions 
(such as the commerce clause), which authorize certain actors to take 
 
60.  RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 10. 
61.  Id. at 21. 
62.  Id. at 13. 
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certain actions, I [distinguish] specific understandings of what such a 
provision authorizes [from] specific understandings of what such a 
provision does not authorize.63 
Rubenfeld’s strong claim is that constitutional law has almost invariably 
respected the historical understanding of those issues to which a constitutional 
provision applies—the specific actions the Free Speech Clause historically was 
thought to forbid or the specific regulations the Commerce Clause historically 
was thought to authorize. With respect to historical understandings about the 
concerns a provision addresses, even the most radical judicial reinterpretations 
have preserved the historical understanding of the text’s applications. 
Furthermore, the “foundational or core applications”64 of a provision—its central 
or most universally shared “Application Understandings”—have acted not only 
to anchor radical reinterpretation in a faithfulness to the text, but also to “serve 
as paradigm cases [that] provide the reference points for the construction of 
doctrinal frameworks.”65 In other words, judges use the historical 
understanding about the issues a provision addresses to ground their reasoning 
in applying the provision to specific controversies. These paradigm cases thus 
define the conceptual universe within which constitutional law is debated and 
made. “The foundational paradigm cases are preinterpretive. They precede 
interpretation; they define its limits and its objects.”66 
But how then does one explain the demonstrable fact that the Supreme 
Court has again and again declared a principle to be the law of the Constitution 
when the makers and early interpreters of the provision in question would have 
been astounded—or shocked—to hear as much? Rubenfeld’s answer is that 
while the Court has almost always observed Application Understandings, it has 
felt entirely free to reject other historical understandings addressing matters as 
to which the provision was originally thought to have no application. The Free 
Speech Clause was historically understood to prohibit government censorship 
and prosecutions for seditious libel, and as Application Understandings those 
twin prohibitions are the paradigm cases which subsequent free speech 
doctrine has respected and revolved around. In contrast, the Free Speech 
Clause was not historically thought to apply to prosecutions for blasphemy, 
 
63.  Id. at 14. The matter is complicated by the fact that a provision that is a grant of exclusive 
power to, say, Congress, has a prohibitory function as well: It forbids other actors such as 
the President from wielding what is put exclusively within Congress’s sphere. Rubenfeld 
carefully works out this point. Id. at 48-49. 
64.  Id. at 14. 
65.  Id. at 15-16. 
66.  Id. at 132. 
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but the Court long ago repudiated that No Application Understanding as a 
guide to the proper interpretation of the First Amendment.67 In a parallel 
fashion, Commerce Clause doctrine has maintained its fidelity to the paradigm 
cases of what the clause was historically understood to authorize Congress to 
do, while the Court has repeatedly upheld exercises of the Commerce Clause to 
regulate matters to which the founders would not have thought it applicable.68 
Grasping the fact that constitutional law treats only understandings about a 
provision’s applications, not expectations about what it would not apply to, as 
the controlling paradigm case(s) is the key to understanding the remarkable 
combination of deep continuity and profound change that according to 
Rubenfeld is the “characteristic mark of American constitutional 
interpretation.”69 The Court has not hesitated to reach decisions “at odds with 
original No-Application Understandings,”70 while even the most radical 
reinterpretations have “labor[ed] under the continuing obligation to do justice 
to the paradigm cases—or, more precisely, to do justice to the text in light of its 
paradigm cases.”71 It therefore would be possible to call Rubenfeld’s theory a 
form of originalism, for he insists that what renders constitutional law a 
coherent and workable form of law, an interpretation of the text of the 
Constitution and not an untethered exercise of power by unelected judicial 
politicians, is this obligation to build judicial doctrine and decision around 
historically determined paradigm cases. But those who usually call themselves 
originalists go further and insist that the Court is obliged to follow original 
understandings about what constitutional provisions do not address (No 
Application Understandings) as well—a practice that the Court has never 
followed and that, if one truly accepted it, would render most of modern 
constitutional law both erroneous and unintelligible.72 Rubenfeld, true 
 
67.  Id. at 25-29. 
68.  Id. at 53-56. 
69.  Id. at 47. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at 17. 
72.  “What the originalists fail to see is that [the Court’s] selective treatment of historical 
meaning is neither arbitrary nor unusual. It is part of the basic structure of American 
constitutional law.” Id. at 31. 
Professor Rubenfeld’s position is further distinguished from that usually thought of as 
originalism in that he believes that under certain circumstances a new understanding of a 
provision’s applications, one not actually entertained when the provision was adopted, can 
become “a ‘fixed star’ or reference point by which future interpretations are measured.” Id. 
at 122. In short, a new paradigm case. He points as examples to the processes by which the 
Sedition Act of 1798 became a paradigm case of what the First Amendment prohibits and by 
which Brown v. Board of Education became a paradigm case of what equal protection 
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conservative that he is, declines to follow would-be originalists into this 
interpretive radicalism. 
If Rubenfeld’s description of the paradigm-case method of constitutional 
interpretation is persuasive, it thus solves at one and the same time the 
intellectual puzzles created by the existence of radical reinterpretation and the 
absence of a law of constitutional interpretation. Radical reinterpretation 
respects the true paradigm cases while treating freely other historical 
understandings; the Court has followed this pattern of decision with great 
fidelity and it is only now in a time of great intellectual disarray (I go beyond 
Rubenfeld’s words) that Rubenfeld’s articulation of our law’s implicit logic has 
become necessary. And it does so without discarding law as interpretation 
altogether (Judge Posner) or delegitimizing the history of judicial 
decisionmaking since the founding (the originalists). 
D. The Success of the Paradigm-Case Method 
This claim is so bold as to be breathtaking, but has Professor Rubenfeld 
pulled it off? In my opinion, the answer is, bluntly, yes. The reader can 
properly reach her own judgment only by going through Part I of Revolution by 
Judiciary herself, but let me indicate why I think Rubenfeld has made good on 
his claim. First, while one could quibble about details and Revolution by 
Judiciary does not attempt a comprehensive examination of constitutional law 
issues, I believe that Rubenfeld is justified in his historical assertion that the 
Court has seldom if ever rejected what Rubenfeld calls the paradigm case(s) 
informing a provision of the text. The endless examples one can give of the 
Court clearly reaching results contrary to the expectations and intentions of the 
text’s makers will turn out, almost invariably, to concern No Application 
Understandings; in other words, the discarded historical understanding 
concerned an issue to which the right or the grant of power was not thought to 
apply. Merely to have observed this apparent pattern in our constitutional law 
is a stunning achievement, and even those who reject Rubenfeld’s overall 
argument are obligated to see the observation as one that they must recognize 
 
requires. Id. at 122-23. Rubenfeld’s view of such after-the-fact understandings is carefully 
nuanced: “[S]ubsequently developed Application Understandings . . . have a status close to 
that of a foundational paradigm case,” but not identical, and “[n]one of them is beyond the 
Court’s power to undo, but the Court would be under an obligation to demonstrate 
compelling justifications for doing so.” Id. at 123. 
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and deal with in offering their own accounts of constitutional 
decisionmaking.73 
A second reason for my belief that Rubenfeld has succeeded is that his 
description of constitutional law as reasoning from the text’s paradigm cases 
addresses constitutional law as the Justices and others have actually practiced 
it; his method, if not his terminology, is recognizable as a description of the 
type of basically common law reasoning that American lawyers and judges have 
employed in interpreting the Constitution since the founding.74 In his 
conclusion, Rubenfeld remarks that “[t]he purpose of constitutional theory is, 
and always has been, to hold the mirror up to constitutional law,” while 
immediately conceding that any theory will to some degree distort its subject.75 
That has to be correct, at least if the term “constitutional theory” is to denote 
any real connection to the constitutional law that goes on in the courts. A 
besetting problem in much highly ambitious constitutional scholarship is its 
remoteness from the practice of constitutional law, and in particular the 
impossibility of imagining anyone other than the scholar himself being able to 
 
73.  Professor Rubenfeld admits the possibility of two counter-examples: the Contracts Clause, 
as to which the Court’s 1934 decision in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 90 U.S. 398 
(1934), arguably upheld a clear example of the sort of law prohibited by the clause’s 
paradigm case; and the use of military force by the President in the absence of a 
congressional declaration of war. As to Blaisdell, Rubenfeld suggests that if the decision did 
in fact violate the Contract Clause’s paradigm case the Court should overrule it; with respect 
to the Declare War Clause, he asserts that “American courts have never officially retreated 
from the principle that the President may not unilaterally declare war.” RUBENFELD, supra 
note 53, at 67-68. Well, no they haven’t—although that formulation of the constitutional 
issue is, I think, uncharacteristically imprecise and misses the point made by some scholars 
(me included) that there is a plausible or even persuasive original understanding that the 
President may make unilateral use of military force in some situations and that the courts 
have not erred in failing to rule otherwise. But if my doubts about Rubenfeld’s brief 
discussion are justified, it only supports his historical claim that the paradigm case theory 
explains the patterns of continuity and change by eliminating one of the two counter-
examples. 
74.  In addition to the historical claim that he has identified what in fact the Court has been 
doing for the past two centuries, Professor Rubenfeld properly notes that his account of 
constitutional law reasoning systematizes the old common law approach to the 
interpretation of a normative instrument. He is also aware, of course, of the important work 
of other distinguished constitutional lawyers who hold somewhat similar views of 
constitutional law. See RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 205 n.1 (citing the work of Philip 
Bobbitt and Richard H. Fallon, Jr.); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 74-86 (1993) (arguing that traditional common lawyers 
looked to the concrete details of past controversies in interpreting the meaning of legal 
rules). “For classical common lawyers, rules were discovered in, debated in terms of, and 
decided with reference to stories of past situations and decisions.” POWELL, supra, at 78. 
75.  RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 201. 
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employ the tools supposedly on offer. (How would one know what counts as a 
textual harmony and what is a mere chance parallel in terminology?) Part I 
(and Part III as well) of Revolution by Judiciary are strongly marked by 
Rubenfeld’s keen interest in showing, both by reflection and by example, the 
specifically legal character of constitutional interpretation. 
I also think that Rubenfeld has rebutted the major criticisms of his legal 
argument that have been or might be made. A critic, first, might worry that the 
problem with Rubenfeld’s paradigm-case account of constitutional law is not 
that it distorts the history or the legal character of constitutional law but that it 
fails to shed much light on how constitutional law ought to be done. If this is 
so, the account fails to address the questions raised by what Rubenfeld 
identifies as the presuppositions of Revolution by Judiciary.76 As he himself 
readily admits, to identify constitutional law with reasoning on the basis of 
paradigm cases does not transform the enterprise into a deductive science. 
Paradigm cases do not dictate unique answers to most constitutional 
questions. Different judges will see the paradigm cases differently; it 
will almost always be possible to capture the paradigmatic applications 
of a particular constitutional right or power within more than one 
interpretive paradigm. This means that five justices of the Supreme 
Court can, at any given moment, redetermine the basic meaning of the 
paradigm cases.77 
Second, and still more fundamentally, our critic might observe, there can 
be disagreement over what paradigm case is embodied in a constitutional 
provision—and even whether there was any foundational or core Application 
Understanding at all.78 Third and finally, the fact that there can be good-faith 
disagreement over the nature and implications of the paradigm cases means 
 
76.  My colleague Erwin Chemerinsky advanced this concern in his review of an earlier version 
of Rubenfeld’s account of the paradigm-case method. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand 
Theory of Constitutional Law?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1261-62 (2002) (reviewing JED 
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(2001)). For the reasons stated in the text, I think that Revolution by Judiciary provides a 
satisfactory answer to Professor Chemerinsky’s criticism. 
77.  RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 17. 
78.  Professor Rubenfeld admits that there is “[n]o a priori necessity dictat[ing] the existence of 
any specific, core, actuating, applications for the various rights and powers included in the 
American Constitution.” Id. at 119. In his judgment, however, “it just so happens that there 
were [such actuating applications] for just about every one of the Constitution’s most 
important rights and powers,” id., so the point is largely theoretical. In the case of a 
provision with no paradigm case, the constitutional interpreter would simply be left with 
applying whatever “principle or proposition [is] set forth in the text” itself. Id. at 134. 
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that there can be bad-faith, manipulative arguments as well, which the method 
itself cannot distinguish on their face from intellectually honest ones. 
This last, third point can be easily dealt with—as alluded to above, 
Revolution by Judiciary assumes from start to finish that the constitutional 
interpreter it is addressing acknowledges that her “first duty” as an interpreter 
is “to abide by the Constitution [and] to deliver a just reading of that 
document according to interpretive criteria.”79 The scientific method doesn’t 
stop researchers from falsifying their results, but it would be silly to reject the 
method for that reason. In just the same way it is not an interesting criticism of 
the interpretive criteria Rubenfeld proposes that the criteria do not in 
themselves prevent an unscrupulous judge from manipulating them. 
The second criticism, that in some instances we may not be able to find, or 
at least to agree on, a paradigmatic Application Understanding for a given 
provision is, I think, more serious, but only modestly so. As Rubenfeld 
implies,80 there is in fact a lot of historical information about the perceived 
original purposes of most important constitutional provisions likely to come 
into controversy. Recall that a Rubenfeldian interpreter is interested only in 
specific Application Understandings, when they exist, and not in the broader 
question of what a provision’s original meaning in general was. This 
significantly reduces the difficulty of making (in an intellectually responsible 
manner) the historical assertions necessary to paradigm-case reasoning as 
compared to those required by a strict originalism: It is easier to conclude that 
the one thing the Fourteenth Amendment was unquestionably meant to do was 
to outlaw the black codes than it is to determine who is right about other, 
broader issues of original meaning. And—from my perspective if not (to the 
same extent, anyway) from Professor Rubenfeld’s—it causes no theoretical 
discomfort to admit that in the absence of a persuasive argument about what a 
provision’s paradigm case is, the provision simply doesn’t apply beyond 
whatever force can be given to its words. 
Finally, our critic’s first worry over the indeterminacy left in place by 
Rubenfeld’s account of constitutional law is, I think, ultimately 
indistinguishable from worry over indeterminacy in the law generally. It is 
true, without any doubt, that at any given point in time there are a great many 
constitutional issues about which reasonable, good-faith interpreters can reach 
opposite conclusions, from identifying what the paradigm cases are and what 
principles they embody to determining how they apply to resolve 
contemporary disputes about very different issues. It is equally true, however, 
 
79.  Id. at 10. 
80.  Id. at 119. 
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that not all arguments are equally plausible, and that the very heart of Anglo-
American law rests in making contestable judgments about which arguments 
are better and which worse whenever one happens to be arguing. It is a 
strength, not a weakness, of Rubenfeld’s book that he avoids any suggestion 
that his own arguments, using what he believes to be the implicit logic of 
constitutional law, are invulnerable to contrary arguments that use the same 
logic more persuasively. What he has identified for us is the way in which we 
have made and should make arguments to one another in the shared task of 
interpreting the Constitution. We should not expect greater precision in 
executing our practices than the subject matter will allow. 
E. Why Is Constitutional Law Binding? An Unnecessary Answer 
In my judgment, then, Revolution by Judiciary is a tremendous contribution 
to our understanding of federal constitutional law. Professor Rubenfeld has 
identified a pattern in the almost infinitely complex and ever-changing 
substance of constitutional law that rescues the field from the charges of 
unintelligibility or sheer political choice. He has, furthermore, suggested what 
I believe to be an entirely satisfactory rationale of why judges should follow the 
traditional interpretive practices of our legal culture in making constitutional 
decisions: Those practices define what constitutional law is,81 and those who 
have undertaken as judges (or others) the obligation to make decisions 
according to constitutional law have a duty to act accordingly. Consider his 
2002 comment on Judge Posner’s denial that a judge has “some kind of moral 
or even political duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by 
precedent”82: 
Unless Posner intends a distinction between abiding by the 
Constitution and abiding by “constitutional text” (and I don’t think he 
intends this distinction), Posner’s statement could be said to amount to 
an express repudiation of his oath of office. In fact, Posner’s view seems 
to make the oath a kind of lark. The whole point of an oath is to create a 
moral or political duty.83 
No more is needed, I think, to explain the normative force for a 
constitutional judge of a correct account of constitutional decisionmaking: She 
is under a moral and political duty stemming from her acceptance of her public 
 
81.  See id. at 132-34. 
82.  Posner, supra note 59, at 739. 
83.  Rubenfeld, supra note 59, at 767. 
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office. The same is true of other citizens—legislators, executive officers, 
jurors—acting in public capacities. In defining for us what constitutional law 
is, Rubenfeld has suggested to us the reason why constitutional law has 
normative force. 
A bit ironically, one person who would certainly dissent from my 
confidence in the persuasiveness and the completeness of Professor 
Rubenfeld’s argument (as I have restated it) is Rubenfeld himself. For him, an 
account of why the law of constitutional law binds judges must go deeper, to 
wrestle with and solve what he calls “the paradox of commitment”—the 
philosophical problem generated by the oddity of treating as normative our 
past commitments when they conflict with our present preferences.84 Most of 
the second section of Revolution by Judiciary builds on Rubenfeld’s earlier work 
employing philosophy and game theory to address the relationship between 
constitutional law and democracy. Rubenfeld’s work in this has led him for 
years to critique “presentist” understandings of democracy and to insist that 
self-government (whether an individual’s or a society’s) requires the making 
and maintenance of commitments over time.85 My sense is that Rubenfeld’s 
current formulation has achieved new levels of clarity and conceptual power. 
And, in this context, I think, the philosophical work is unnecessary and 
distracting. Professor Rubenfeld forthrightly admits, at the beginning of the 
second section, that he is simply assuming “without ever proving, that what is 
true of individual commitments is true, mutatis mutandis, of constitutional 
commitments—that political self-government may be profitably understood by 
analogy to individual self-government.”86 Precisely: The theory of self-
government set out in this book rests on a highly contestable analogy between 
the moral identity of individuals and the nature of a democratic and 
constitutional state. Many of his readers, myself included, will not find the 
analogy persuasive, and for us the attempt to ground constitutional law in the 
theory therefore fails to get off the ground. I think that Rubenfeld’s analysis of 
the role of temporally extended commitments in our individual moral lives is 
potentially a major contribution to philosophical ethics, and I hope that he 
pursues this work further, unshackled by a felt need to relate the analysis to 
constitutional law. But he should also free his powerful and persuasive account 
of constitutional law from the link to a novel, highly contestable philosophical 
 
84.  See RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 71-79. 
85.  It would be impossible to summarize Professor Rubenfeld’s elegant argument in a footnote, 
and I will not try. But see id. at 88 (summarizing the solution to the paradox of commitment 
as lying in the necessity of being able to make and keep commitments to “self-government 
over time” if an individual or society is to enjoy autonomy). 
86.  Id. at 72. 
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theory. The law doesn’t need the theory any more than the theory benefits 
from being forced to accommodate the law. 
Professor Rubenfeld, I can imagine, might respond that there is a serious 
problem with my suggestion that he disconnect his legal theory from his 
philosophical one. With respect to judges and others with public duties they 
have voluntarily undertaken, he might concede that one can point to those 
voluntary undertakings as the basis for holding that they have a moral and 
political duty to act in accordance with the norms defining the practice of 
constitutional decisionmaking, but such reasoning does not address the duties, 
or lack thereof, of the vast majority of Americans, the vast majority of the time. 
Most of the time, most of us have undertaken no public duty and exercise no 
public office. What gives the Constitution normative force for us? Why should 
we, for example, obey constitutional laws enacted by Congress? These are 
profound questions, but they are (let it be noted) simply a peculiarly American 
twist on the great problem of political obligation, which goes back to Socrates 
if not before in the Western tradition alone. Many conflicting answers have 
been proposed, and American society has never had—and doubtless never will 
reach—a consensus on what the American answer is, or rather what it ought to 
be. That is, furthermore, a good thing: I think (and I believe Professor 
Rubenfeld thinks) that one of the most attractive features of American 
constitutionalism is the absence of prescriptions about “what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”87 The question 
of what, if any, moral obligations we owe the Republic simply because we find 
ourselves within its jurisdiction and subject as a practical matter to the exercise 
of power by its public officials, is not, in the end, a matter of constitutional law 
at all,88 and in turn constitutional law does not depend on or need a 
philosophical foundation. Like the Republic it structures, the practice of 
constitutional law is a political reality based not in theory but in history.89 By 
rethinking and clarifying Rubenfeld’s account of paradigm-case reasoning, 
 
87.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
88.  There is perhaps an exception: The Thirteenth Amendment purports—or so it has been 
interpreted by the Court, along with the right to travel interstate—to apply to private as well 
as governmental action, and one might expect then that private citizens would stand in the 
same position with respect to the enforcement of the Amendment that public officials stand 
with respect to all constitutional commands. As an empirical matter, however, I think most 
Americans would accept, from their varying moral perspectives, the existence of a moral 
prohibition on enslaving someone else, so the difficulty seems hypothetical. 
89.  “American constitutional law begins with specific commitments, sometimes written in 
blood. This is not a matter of a priori or conceptual necessity; it is a matter of history.” 
RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 134. 
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Revolution by Judiciary makes a signal and highly welcome contribution to our 
understanding of the law of the Constitution. 
conclusion 
America’s Constitution and Revolution by Judiciary are very different books, 
but they share a robust confidence in the possibility of writing constitutional 
law in a grand manner even in an era in which almost everything in the field is 
“passionately contested, with little common ground from which to build 
agreement.”90 The books are marked by some strong similarities as well as 
striking differences. Both books rest on an almost medieval “realism” in talking 
about “We the People” that is startling to those of us of a nominalistic mindset; 
the reader of this Commentary will have gathered by now that I think both 
books are marred by misidentifying (as I see it) the language of American 
political discourse with a reality external to that language. Furthermore, and 
positively, both books take seriously the role of original understandings in 
American constitutionalism in ways that transcend the tired old originalism 
battles of the late twentieth century. Where the two books most sharply 
diverge is that Revolution by Judiciary has as its ultimate focus the actual practice 
of constitutional law, while America’s Constitution is concerned with unveiling a 
set of textual meanings that are not finally rooted in history or law.  
Perhaps most importantly, however, both these books suggest that the 
right response to the existing discord in constitutional law and scholarship is 
not to retreat to small-scale projects, but to seek with renewed zeal a grand 
vision of constitutional meaning. Professor Amar and Professor Rubenfeld 
have shown real moral courage in going out on Professor Tribe’s limb to offer 
us broad-ranging attempts to speak about the whole of their respective, 
somewhat different, subjects. I have suggested some criticisms of each book 
out of the conviction that we honor a scholar when we take his or her work 
seriously enough to disagree. 
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90.  Tribe, supra note 1, at 292. 
